Revised: June 23, 2013
If you are facing prosecution, fine, incarceration, deportation, loss of revenue, loss of business opportunity, or some other injury in fact, as a direct result of:
then you and your attorney should at least consider pursuing a collateral attack against that particular law, directive, executive order or official action.
A collateral attack does not seek to remove anyone from office. It merely asks a court to invalidate a specific action by an officeholder, on grounds that the officeholder does not meet the legal requirements of the office he or she is holding.
President Obama publicly admits he was born with foreign nationality. Even if he were born on U.S. soil and had acquired U.S. citizenship at birth, the undisputed fact remains that he was, at birth, a British subject by descent from his father (FactCheck.org: Obama's Kenyan Citizenship). For that reason alone, Barack Obama Jr., even if a U.S. citizen at the time of his birth, is not a natural born citizen, hence is not constitutionally eligible to serve as President (Why Obama is Ineligible -- Regardless of His Birthplace).
Furthermore, President Obama's published Long Form Certificate of LIve Birth is an artificial contruct, not a scanned image of a paper document (Zullo Affidavit 5-14-2013). It is therefore possible that President Obama might have been born in a foreign country. Until this possibility is eliminated, it provides yet another basis on which to challenge President Obama's "natural born citizen" status.
Under the de facto officer doctrine, the official actions of an ineligible officeholder are valid and legally binding, despite the fact that he or she is holding office illegally. But there are exceptions to the de facto officer rule. These exceptions may prove beneficial to persons, groups and business which are adversely affected by the official acts of President Obama and his appointees.
This document is divided into three sections. Part I explains why President Obama does not meet the presidential "natural born citizen" eligibility requirement specified in the U.S. Constitution. Part II discusses the circumstances under which an individual, business, organization or group, which was harmed or injured by a governmental action, may challenge that action collaterally. The third section is an Appendix listing Federal judges appointed by President Obama.
(2) Foreign Birthplace. Circumstantial evidence -- including the non-authentic nature of his published long-form birth certificate (Zullo Affidavit 5-14-2013) -- suggests the President may have been born overseas. If, during discovery, the courts find that (a) Obama was born in a foreign country, and (b) prior to the 2008 election, Congress and the voting public were advised of the possibility of his foreign birth, the courts may rule that he is a usurper, in which case all of his official acts may be declared null and void.
(3) Wong Kim Ark. The modern-day consensus of legal opinion is that anyone born on U.S. soil is a natural born citizen, regardless of his parents' citizenship. This consensus is based largely on the Supreme Court's reasoning in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898). The Court did not rule that Wong was a natural born citizen; it merely ruled that he was a citizen. Nevertheless, the Court's reasoning, when carried to its logical conclusion, seems to imply that mere birth on U.S. soil is sufficient to confer natural born citizenship. The Wong Kim Ark reasoning is unsound for two reasons: (a) it is based on demonstrably false assertions and misrepresentations of prior Supreme Court decisions; and (b) the author of the Wong Kim Ark opinion, Justice Horace Gray, had a compelling personal interest in Wong's legal status at birth, hence Gray's impartiality and objectivity in the Wong Kim Ark matter cannot be relied upon.
(4) Natural Born Citizenship. Six sources establish that natural born citizenship entails the absence of foreign citizenship at birth: (1) historical precedent of U.S. Presidents born after 1787, (2) the original purpose and intent of the Constitutional "natural born citizen" provision, (3) the 1866 Congressional debates regarding the 14th Amendment citizenship clause, (4) Supreme Court precedent, (5) 18th century English Common Law, and (6) the 18th century meaning of "natural citizenship". Since Barack Obama was born with foreign nationality, he does not meet the presidential "natural born citizen" eligibility requirement specified in the U.S. Constitution. Even if President Obama is not a usurper, he is nonetheless a de facto officer -- one who is performing the duties of an office, but whose title to that office is defective.
(6) Foreign Influence: According to multiple historical sources, the purpose of the presidential "natural born citizen" eligibility requirement is to reduce the likelihood of "foreign influence" exerting itself through the presidency. Barack Obama was born with foreign citizenship (in addition to U.S. citizenship), hence is not a natural born citizen. But more importantly, his foreign citizenship at birth was followed by (and therefore accentuated by) his foreign upbringing and education, which appear to influence his presidential actions in at least some cases. If you are adversely affected by an official act of President Obama or one of his appointees, and the act has the appearance of foreign influence, you should consider pursuing a collateral attack against that act.
In modern times, you must be a "natural born citizen" in order to be Constitutionally eligible to serve as President. Throughout history, prominent individuals -- William Rawle (1829), Lewis Sandford (1844), William Marcy (1854), Edward Bates (1862), Edward McPherson (1864), George Bancroft (1866), Richard Cudahy (1983), and others -- have expressed their opinion that, since everyone born in 18th century England was a natural-born subject, it must follow that everyone born in the United States is a natural born citizen.
However, a more careful and thorough examination of historical evidence, including the Supreme Court record, shows that a natural born citizen is one who is, at birth, a citizen of the United States exclusively and is not a citizen or subject of any foreign country. Moreover, children who are born with exclusive U.S. citizenship tend to be raised in the United States, as U.S. citizens, by parents or guardians who are themselves U.S. citizens.
The 1797 English translation of Vattel's Law of Nations depicts "natural born citizens" as "pure" citizens (citizens of one, and only one, country exclusively) at birth. They are not born in a foreign country and are not born of a foreign-citizen parent. Consequently, they do not acquire foreign citizenship either by birthplace (the jus soli principle) or by parentage (the jus sanguinis principle).
The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens (Vattel, Sect 212).
The circumstances of one's birth are often precursors to the circumstances of one's upbringing. There are exceptions, of course, but as a general rule, those who are born in a country are also raised in that country, and the children of citizens tend to be reared and educated by citizens. Someone who is a natural born citizen at the time of his or her birth often continues to be a natural born citizen in later life.
In 1774, Patsall translated Institutio Oratoria into English. In his translation, he implied that a natural born citizen is a "pure" citizen, not only by birth, but also by education:
Therefore, if possible, every word and the very tone of voice, should bespeak the natural born citizen of Rome, that the language may be purely Roman, and not so by a right different from birth and education. (J. Patsall (translator), Ouintilian's Institutes of the Orator, Volume 2, (1774), p.32).
In 1859, President James Buchanan asked his Attorney General, Jeremiah Black, for an official opinion regarding Christian Ernst, a naturalized U.S. citizen whom the German government had conscripted into military service. In his written opinion, Attorney General Black explained that there are only two categories of U.S. citizens: natives, and adopted citizens. All U.S. citizens owe allegiance to the United States exclusively. The difference between a native and an adopted citizen is that (a) a native "never did owe fealty elsewhere" and (b) "none but a native [natural born citizen] can be President". Persons who acquired foreign citizenship at birth might be U.S. citizens by statute or naturalization, but are not natives:
There can be no doubt that naturalization does, pro facto, place the native and adopted citizen in precisely the same relations with the Government under which they live, except so far as the express and positive law of the country has made a distinction in favor of one or the other. ...
Here none but a native can be President. ...
A Native and a Naturalized American can go forth with equal security over every sea and through every land under heaven, including the country in which the latter was born. ... They are both of them American citizens, and their exclusive allegiance is due to the Government of the United States. One of them never did owe fealty elsewhere, and the other, at the time of his naturalization, solemnly and rightfully, in pursuance of public law and municipal regulations, threw off, renounced and abjured forever all allegiance to every foreign prince, potentate, State and sovereignty whatever, and especially to that sovereign whose subject he had previously been. (Jeremiah Black, Opinion upon Expatriation and Naturalization (1859), boldface emphasis added).
The sources cited above imply that nativeness, or natural born citizenship, is the state or condition of "pure" citizenship (exclusive U.S. citizenship and the absence of foreign citizenship) which begins at birth and, as a general rule, continues into later life.
Barack Obama was born with foreign nationality (FactCheck.org: Obama's Kenyan Citizenship). For that reason alone, Barack Obama is not a natural born citizen, hence is not Constitutionally eligible to serve as President. Moreover, from ages 5 through 10, he was raised in Indonesia, as an Indonesian citizen, by Indonesian parents (Obama's Indonesian citizenship). His mother was an Indonesian citizen by marriage and his step-father was an Indonesian citizen by birth. Consequently, Obama fails to conform to the meaning and intent of the "natural born citizen" provision, not only because of his foreign citizenship at birth, but also because of his foreign upbringing and education.
There are three categories of public officials: A de jure officer is one who acquires and holds office legally. A de facto officer is an officeholder who is performing the duties and functions of his office, but whose title to his office is defective due to an oversight or legal technicality. A usurper is one who takes or holds office in overt and blatant disregard for the law.
The case law distinguishes among three different legal statuses that might be ascribed to a person who appears to hold a public office: the person might be a de jure officer, or a de facto officer, or what the courts characterize as an intruder or usurper. As a practical matter, to the outside world there is no legal difference between the acts of a de jure officer and a de facto officer -- the actions are valid and cannot be attacked on the ground that the officer is not legally in office. ... If a person is a mere intruder or usurper, however, any actions taken by the person are invalid and will not be recognized or enforced by the courts. (De Facto Officers Versus Intruders)
If Obama was foreign-born, the courts may rule that he is a usurper. But even if Obama is not a usurper, he is nonetheless a de facto officer. Regardless of where he was born, he acquired foreign nationality at birth, thus does not meet the "natural born citizen" eligibility requirement.
According to the de facto officer doctrine, the official actions of a de facto officer are valid and legally binding, despite the fact that he is holding office illegally. But there are exceptions to the de facto officer rule. In particular, the de facto doctrine does not uphold the official actions of an ineligible officeholder when those actions violate the purpose of the eligibility requirement.
According to multiple historical sources (John Jay, Letter to George Washington (1787); Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (1833), Sect 1473; Thomas Paine, Rights of Man (1791), Chapter 4, Part 2; and others), the purpose of the "natural born citizen" provision in the Constitution is to prevent, or at least reduce the likelihood of, electing and inaugurating a president whose judgement is subject to foreign influence. The mere circumstances of one's birth, by themselves, do not exert much influence over one's judgment in later life. But President Obama's judgment has exhibited the appearance of being influenced, not only by his foreign citizenship at birth, but also (more importantly) by his foreign upbringing.
Thus, if you are adversely affected by the official act of a non-natural-born-citizen President or one of his appointees, you might be able to pursue a collateral attack against that official action, especially if the action appears to have been influenced in some way, directly or indirectly, by the President's past and present ties to foreign countries.
At this time, there is insufficient information in the public domain to conclusively establish President Obama's actual place of birth. Some anecdotal and circumstantial evidence suggests that he might have been born overseas, but none of this evidence rises to the level of proof. Nevertheless, if you intend to challenge a governmental action on the basis of the President's ineligibility, you may wish to include -- but not rely exclusively on -- a challenge to Obama's birthplace.
According to his published Certificate of Live Birth, Barack Obama Jr. was born in Hawaii on August 4, 1961. At the time of his birth, his mother, Stanley Ann Dunham, was a U.S. citizen; and his father, Barack Obama Senior, was an alien visiting the U.S. temporarily.
During the 1960s, whenever a birth was registered in Hawaii, the Hawaii Department of Vital Statistics automatically generated a birth announcement and sent it to the local newspapers for publication. Barack Obama's birth announcement -- which appeared in the Honolulu Advertiser, August 13, 1961, page B-6, and Honolulu Star Bulletin, August 14, 1961 -- establishes that his birth was registered in Hawaii in August 1961.
To this day, the State of Hawaii has not disclosed the source of Barack Obama's birth registration. The Hawaii Department of Health has not revealed who registered Obama's birth or where his birth information came from. There exists a possibility that Obama's birth registration was based solely on a family member's uncorroborated statement (Clearing the Smoke, and Obama's Birth Announcements).
In some cases, the U.S. State Department does not accept a birth certificate as evidence of birth in the United States, unless the information shown on that birth certificate came from a hospital or other "appropriate medical facility" (War Veterans Denied Passports Despite Having Birth Certificates). Tim Adams claims that, while working as a senior elections clerk in Honolulu in 2008, he learned that Obama's birth information, on file in Hawaii, did not originate from any hospital or medical facility in Hawaii (Tim Adams Affidavit).
If President Obama was born outside of the United States in 1961, the following rules would have controlled his legal status at birth:
What are the rules for people born [outside the United States] between December 23, 1952 and November 13, 1986?
... children born abroad to two US citizen parents were US citizens at birth, as long as one of the parents resided in the US at some point before the birth of the child.
When one parent was a US citizen and the other a foreign national, the US citizen parent must have resided in the US for a total of 10 years prior to the birth of the child, with five of the years after the age of 14. An exception for people serving in the military was created by considering time spent outside the US on military duty as time spent in the US.
While there were initially rules regarding what the child must do to retain citizenship, amendments since 1952 have eliminated these requirements.
Children born out of wedlock to a US citizen mother were US citizens if the mother was resident in the US for a period of one year prior to the birth of the child. Children born out of wedlock to a US citizen father acquired US citizenship only if legitimated before turning 21. (Citizenship Rules for People Born Outside the United States)
Stanley Ann was 18 years old when she gave birth to Obama Jr. If she were single at the time, her son would have acquired U.S. citizenship at birth, even if he were born overseas. However, since she was married to a foreign national, Stanley Ann was too young (she needed to be at least 19) to confer U.S. citizenship by descent. Consequently, if her son was foreign-born, he was not even a citizen, let alone a natural born citizen, when he was born.
According to a pamphlet published in 1991 by his literary agent (Acton & Dystel), President Obama was born in Kenya (1991 Booklet). The pamphlet's information was undoubtedly sanctioned by Obama himself (Watson).
In a speech before the Kenyan National Assembly, James Orengo, the Kenyan Minister for Lands, indicated that President Barack Obama was born in Kenya:
If America was living in a situation where they feared ethnicity and did not see itself as a multiparty state or nation, how could a young man born here in Kenya, who is not even a native American, become the President of America? It is because they did away with exclusion. (National Assembly Official Report, Thursday, 25th March 2010, p.31)
According to hand-written "line records" in the British National Archives, a child was born in Kenya in 1961, to a father named Obama (Birth Records found in British National Archives).
The Boston Public Library contains an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) document showing that, during the second half of 1961, a U.S. citizen gave birth to a baby in East Africa (which includes Kenya); and the INS issued a Certificate of U.S. Citizenship to that baby when it entered the United States (INS Doc Found). If Stanley Ann gave birth in a foreign country and claimed to be unmarried, the INS would have considered her baby as a U.S. citizen.
Today, President Obama asserts that he was born in Hawaii, but so far, he has not provided any court-admissible evidence to substantiate his assertion. His published Certificate of Live Birth is demonstrably non-authentic (Zullo Affidavit 5-14-2013). His social security number appears to have been obtained illegally; it was issued in Connecticut in 1977 when he was a high school student in Hawaii (Daniels v. Ohio). Moreover, his selective service registration appears to have been falsified (Letter to Director Lawrence Romo).
In Supreme Court opinions prior to 1898, children born in the United States, of alien parents, did not acquire U.S. citizenship at birth (see, for example, Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor (1830), Slaughter-House Cases (1872), and Elk v. Wilkins (1884)). The Supreme Court ruling in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), contradicting earlier Supreme Court opinions, extended U.S. citizenship to the U.S.-born children of permanently-domiciled alien parents. However, President Obama's father was never permanently-domiciled in the U.S.; he was visiting the U.S. temporarily on a student visa.
During the Clinton and Bush administrations, the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual acknowledged that the U.S.-born children of a "non-domiciled" (temporarily- or illegally-resident) alien parent are "considered as" U.S. citizens by modern-day policy, but the actual citizenship status of such children has never been conclusively established as a matter of settled law.
In August 2009, the Obama administration -- without legislative or judicial reason for doing so -- revised the Foreign Affairs Manual by removing texts indicating uncertainty regarding the status of U.S.-born children of alien parents living in the U.S. temporarily or illegally (Revisions to Foreign Affairs Manual August 2009).
At this time, President Obama's birthplace and citizenship remain unresolved.
A collateral attack against a presidential action, based on the President's ineligibility, should include (though it should not rely exclusively upon) a challenge to the President's birthplace. If the courts, during discovery, find that (a) Obama was indeed foreign-born, (b) he deliberately concealed his birthplace from the public, and (c) Congress knew or should have known that he was hiding something regarding his birth circumstances, then the courts may rule that Obama is a usurper, in which case none of his official actions would be valid.
The modern-day consensus of legal opinion is that all persons born in the United States (except the children of foreign diplomats and enemy invaders) are natural born citizens, regardless of their parents' citizenship and regardless of any foreign citizenship also acquired at birth (Legal Information Institute: Natural Born Citizen). This consensus is based largely on the Supreme Court's reasoning in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898).
In the Wong Kim Ark case, Wong was born in the United States, of permanently-domiciled alien parents. The Supreme Court did not rule that Wong was a natural born citizen; it merely ruled that he was a citizen. Nevertheless, the Court's reasoning in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, when carried to its logical conclusion, seems to imply (though it does not explicitly state) that anyone born on U.S. soil is a natural born citizen.
As of October 2012, there have been at least 175 legal challenges to Barack Obama's eligibility to serve as President (Birther Case List). All have been dismissed on technicalities (mootness, lack of standing, lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, etc.). In a few of these cases, judges have issued non-legally-binding commentary, or dicta, regarding President Obama's "natural born citizen" status. These dicta have been overwhelmingly supportive of the viewpoint (implied by the Supreme Court's reasoning in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark) that President Obama is a natural born citizen by virtue of birth on U.S. soil. See, for example, Ankeny v. Indiana (2009) and Tisdale v. Obama (2012).
However, the judges issuing these dicta seemed unaware that the reasoning in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark is unsound for two reasons. First, it was based on demonstrably false premises and misrepresentations of prior Supreme Court decisions (Donofrio Amicus Brief). Second, the Court's reasoning in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark was written by Horace Gray, whose objectivity in this case appears to have been compromised by a compelling personal interest in Mr. Wong's citizenship at birth.
In 1881, President Chester Arthur appointed Horace Gray to the Supreme Court. When Chester was born, his father, William Arthur, was a British subject, not a U.S. citizen. Consequently, Chester Arthur and Mr. Wong were born under similar circumstances. Each was born in the United States, to a permanently-domiciled alien father. If Wong was not a U.S. citizen at birth, then neither was Arthur, in which case Arthur's presidency and judicial appointments were unconstitutional (Historical Breakthrough -- Chester Arthur).
By ruling that Wong acquired U.S. citizenship at birth, the Supreme Court in effect ruled that Chester Arthur had also acquired U.S. citizenship at birth, thereby conferring at least an appearance of legitimacy on Arthur's presidency and Gray's appointment to the Supreme Court.
NOTE: According to a widely-held and deeply-entrenched modern-day viewpoint, the reasoning in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), though flawed, is the Supreme Court's last word relating to citizenship and natural born citizenship; and as such, it overrules all prior opinions, including all prior Supreme Court opinions, to the contrary. Consequently, any challenge to President Obama's eligibility, based on his foreign citizenship at birth, has little chance of success, unless the challenger shows conclusively why the Supreme Court's reasoning in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark is unsound.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark is further discussed in subsection 4.4 below.
Six source establish that natural born citizenship implies the absence of foreign citizenship at birth. These sources are summarized in subsections 4.1 through 4.6 below.
NOTE: Throughout U.S. history, there has been an ongoing debate over what a natural born citizen is. We do not presume to settle this debate here. We merely assert that historical evidence, including Supreme Court precedent, establishes what a natural born citizen is not. A natural born citizen is, at minimum, one who is not, at birth, a citizen or subject of any foreign country.
4.1: Historical Precedent: Under its current Constitution, the United States has had 44 presidents, including Barack Obama. Of these 44 presidents, 34 were born after 1787 (the year the Constitution was adopted) and were therefore subject to the presidential "natural born citizen" eligibility requirement. With only two exceptions, all of these 34 presidents were born in the United States, of parents who were both U.S. citizens (Citizenship of U.S. Presidents).
The two exceptions were Chester Arthur and Barack Obama. While running for office in 1880, Chester Arthur repeatedly made false statements to journalists about his family history (and later burned nearly all of his family records), thereby obscuring his British nationality at birth. He was born in the United States, but at the time of his birth, his father was a British subject, not a U.S. citizen (Historical Breakthrough - Chester Arthur).
January 20, 2009 was the first time in history that the U.S. knowingly inaugurated a President who was born after 1787 and whose parents were not both U.S. citizens. Moreover, it was the first time that the U.S. knowingly inaugurated a post-1787-born President who was a foreign citizen at the time of his birth.
4.2: Original Purpose: According to several historical sources (John Jay, Letter to George Washington (1787); Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (1833), Sect 1473; Thomas Paine, Rights of Man (1791), Chapter 4, Part 2; and others), the purpose of the Constitutional "natural born citizen" provision was to exclude "foreigners" from the presidency and thereby protect the presidency from "foreign influence".
During the late 18th century, the word "foreigner" had a broad and widely-inclusive meaning. According to "the overwhelming majority of sources available to the drafters of the judicial bill [of 1789]", the meaning of the word "foreigner" included, not only persons born overseas, but also foreign citizens and subjects:
A "foreigner" is defined as an individual who: 1) is foreign-born, or more specifically, is a foreign citizen or subject, or 2) is a foreign-born individual residing extraterritorially [outside the sovereign's territory]. (Berry, pp.337-8).
A person can be both a U.S. citizen and a foreigner simultaneously. According to Webster, persons born outside of the territory or jurisdiction of the United States are foreigners, and in some sense continue to be foreigners after they renounce their foreign allegiances and become naturalized U.S. citizens:
A naturalized person is a citizen; but we still call him a foreigner by birth. (Webster: foreigner, 1828)
If the framers of the Constitution had intended merely to exclude foreign-born individuals from the presidency, "native-born" rather than "natural born" would have been sufficient .
The fact that the Constitution says "natural" instead of native shows to my mind that the distinction was thought of and probably discussed. A natural born citizen would be one who by nature, that is by inheritance, so to speak, was a citizen, as distinguished from one who was by nativity or locality of birth a citizen. ... It seems to me that if the founders of the government had meant to confine the presidency to such of its citizens as were born upon the soil of the country, they would have used the word "native," which is a much more apt word than natural. (Percy A. Bridgham, People's Lawyer, (1896)).
If it was intended that anybody who was a citizen by birth should be eligible, it would only have been necessary to say, "no person, except a native-born citizen"; but the framers thought it wise ... to provide that the president should at least be the child of citizens owing allegiance to the United States at the time of his birth. (Alexander Porter Morse, Natural-born Citizen of the United States, Albany Law Journal, Vol.66 (1904-1905)).
The use of the words "natural born" instead of "native-born" suggests that the Framers of the Constitution intended to exclude not only foreign-born foreigners from the presidency, but native-born foreigners as well.
Native-born foreigners are person who, though born on U.S. soil, are nevertheless "foreigners", i.e., citizens or subjects of a foreign country. Native-born foreigners fall into two categories. In the first category are those who are, at birth, foreign citizens or subjects by descent from their parents. The second category consists of those who are born with exclusive U.S. citizenship, but in later life, become foreign nationals by adoption, marriage or naturalization.
As the word "born" implies, natural born citizenship pertains only to one's status at the time of one's birth. If you were not a natural born citizen when you were born, you can never become a natural born citizen in later life. If you were born a citizen of the United States exclusively, but later became a citizen or subject of a foreign country, you would not necessarily lose your U.S. citizenship (Perkins v. Elg (1939)); you would remain a natural born citizen according to the letter of the law, even though you would no longer conform to the purpose or spirit of the natural born citizen provision.
Since natural born citizenship is established only at the time of birth, the only "foreigners" that the natural born citizen provision can actually or explicitly exclude from the presidency are persons who were foreigners when they were born; the "natural born citizen" provision does little to exclude "foreigners" from the presidency, unless "natural born citizen" means one who is not a "foreigner" at birth.
4.3: 14th Amendment: The 1866 Civil Rights Act and the 14th Amendment do not define natural born citizens. They merely specify those whom the Constitution recognizes as citizens. Nevertheless, according to the 1866 Congressional record, the citizenship clauses in the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the 14th Amendment were written so as to not exclude natural born citizens from citizenship recognition. Therefore, natural born citizenship is a subset of 14th Amendment citizenship. If you are not even a citizen according to the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the 14th Amendment, it is safe to say that you are not a natural born citizen.
The citizenship clause of the 1866 Civil Rights Act (passed on April 9, 1866) states:
...all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States;
Representative John Bingham (1815-1900), considered the father of the 14th Amendment, explained that the citizenship clause in the 1866 Civil Rights Act is consistent with the meaning of "natural born citizen" in the U.S. Constitution:
I find no fault with the introductory clause [of the 1866 Civil Rights Act], which is simply declaratory of what is written in the Constitution, that every human being born within the jurisdiction of the United States of parents not owing allegiance to any foreign sovereignty is, in the language of your Constitution itself, a natural born citizen; ... (Congressional Globe, 39th, 1st Sess.(1866), p.1291, center column, emphasis added)
The citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment (passed on June 13, 1866 and adopted on July 9, 1868) states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
The framers of the 14th Amendment explained that the word "jurisdiction", as used in the 14th Amendment citizenship clause, means complete U.S. jurisdiction, i.e., "not subject to any foreign power" (Madison, (2007)) 
Senator Jacob Howard (1805-1871) was a member of the Joint Committee which drafted the 14th Amendment. He explained that the purpose of the jurisdictional phrase in the 14th Amendment was to exclude, from citizenship, persons who, though born on U.S. soil, were nevertheless "foreigners" at birth. Such "foreigners" could become naturalized U.S. citizens in later life, but they were not U.S. citizens at birth.
This amendment which I have offered is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of the United States. This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to families of ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States, but will include every other class of persons. (Congressional Globe: Senate, 39th Congress, 1st Session, 1866, p.2890, center column, boldface emphasis added)
Senator Lyman Trumbull was Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1861 to 1872. He and Senator Howard agreed that the word "jurisdiction", as used in the 14th Amendment, means "full and complete" U.S. jurisdiction, i.e., the absence of foreign jurisdiction:
Mr. TRUMBULL: ... The provision is, that "all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens." That means "subject to the complete jurisdiction thereof."
... What do we mean by "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States?" Not owing allegiance to anybody else. That is what it means. (Congressional Globe, Senate, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p.2893)
Mr. HOWARD: ... I concur entirely with the honorable Senator from Illinois [Trumbull], in holding that the word "jurisdiction," as here employed, ought to be construed so as to imply a full and complete jurisdiction on the part of the United States, coextensive in all respects with the constitutional power of the United States, whether exercised by Congress, by the executive, or by the judicial department; that is to say, the same jurisdiction in extent and quality as applies to every citizen of the United States now. (Congressional Globe, Senate, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p.2895)
In 1873, the Supreme Court affirmed that the U.S.-born children of alien parents are not subject to (exclusive) U.S. "jurisdiction", therefore do not acquire 14th Amendment citizenship by birth:
'All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.' ... The phrase, 'subject to its jurisdiction' was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States. (Slaughter-House Cases, 1873)
In 1884, the Supreme Court further affirmed that a child, born in the United States, acquires 14th Amendment citizenship at birth only if such child, when born, owes "no allegiance to any alien power". "Alien powers" include, but are not limited to, Indian tribes:
The main object of the opening sentence of the fourteenth amendment was to settle the question, upon which there had been a difference of opinion throughout the country and in this court, as to the citizenship of free negroes, (Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393;) and to put it beyond doubt that all persons, white or black, and whether formerly slaves or not, born or naturalized in the United States, and owing no allegiance to any alien power, should be citizens of the United States and of the state in which they reside. (Elk v. Wilkins (1884), boldface emphasis added)
Since Barack Obama Jr. was born a foreign citizen owing allegiance to an alien power, he was not a 14th Amendment citizen at birth, according to the 14th Amendment's originally-intended meaning. The President might be a U.S. citizen by U.S. policy, but he did not receive U.S. citizenship from the 14th Amendment as originally designed. If an individual is not a U.S. citizen at birth, he or she is not a natural born citizen.
4.4: Supreme Court Precedent: The "birthplace-only theory" posits that, since nearly everyone born in 18th century England was a natural-born subject, nearly everyone born within the United States must be a natural born citizen. Throughout history, various individuals have embraced this theory, but to this day, the Supreme Court has not.
On two occasions -- Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor (1830) and Elk v. Wilkins (1884) -- the Court ruled that a child born on U.S. soil, of parents owing allegiance to a sovereignty other than the United States, does not acquire U.S. citizenship (natural-born or otherwise) at birth.
According to Minor v. Happersett (1874), all native-born children (children born on U.S. soil) are divided into two classes. The first class consists of U.S.-born children whose parents are U.S. citizens. The second class consists of all other native-born children, regardless of their parents' citizenship. The Court used the term "natural born citizen" only in reference to members of the first class. The Court doubted whether members of the second class were even citizens, let alone natural born citizens.
The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. (Minor v. Happersett, 1874)
In Minor v. Happersett, natural born citizens are distinguished from aliens or foreigners, implying that a natural born citizen is one who, at birth, is not a "foreigner", i.e., is not a citizen or subject of any foreign country.
In U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), the Supreme Court -- contradicting prior Court decisions and ignoring the original intent of the 14th Amendment  -- ruled that the U.S.-born children of permanently-domiciled alien parents are U.S. citizens. The Court did not rule that such children are natural born citizens.
To this day, the Supreme Court has never regarded the U.S.-born children of non-U.S.-citizen parents as natural born citizens. Whenever the Supreme Court, in a majority opinion, has referred to an individual as a natural-born citizen, the individual was always U.S.-born of U.S.-citizen parents. See, for example, Kwock Jan Fat v. White (1920) and Perkins v. Elg (1939).
The Court's reasoning in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark seems to imply, though it does not explicitly state, that birthplace alone is sufficient to confer natural born citizenship. But the Wong Kim Ark reasoning is unsound for two reasons. First, it is based largely on erroneous premises and misrepresentations of prior Supreme Court decisions (Donofrio Amicus Brief). Second, Justice Horace Gray, who wrote the Opinion of the Court in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, had a compelling personal interest in the outcome of the Wong Kim Ark case; consequently his motives and objectivity regarding that case cannot be relied upon (Historical Breakthrough - Chester Arthur).
NOTE: It is neither appropriate nor necessary to re-litigate U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark or to challenge the Wong Kim Ark ruling. It is sufficient merely to assert that the Court's reasoning, being unsound, should not be applied outside of, and should not be extended beyond, the Court's actual holding in the Wong Kim Ark case.
4.5: English Common Law: An English word or term can have an actual meaning and a legal meaning, depending on context. The word "children" can refer to one's actual (biological) children, or one's legal children by marriage or adoption. The word "possession" can mean actual possession (physical custody and control) or legal (constructive) possession (Legal Definition of 'Possession'). Likewise, in 18th century English law, the term "natural-born" had both an actual meaning and legal meaning.
During the 18th century, you became a "subject" of the English king in one of three ways: by birth, by act of Parliament, or by act of the king. There were two kinds of acts of Parliament. A public act was a statute that conferred "subject" status automatically to anyone who met certain criteria. A private act granted "subject" status to a specific individual or group which had petitioned for nationalization (Tutorial, Question 13: 18th Century English Subjects).
Persons who became English subjects by acts of the king were called "denizens". Although they were English subjects, they were not natural-born subjects. A denizen (by act of the king) was "in a kind of middle state between an alien and a natural-born subject" (William Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 1, Chapter 10 (1765-1769)).
All other English subjects -- that is, all persons who acquired Engish subjecthood either "by birth, or by act of Parliament" -- were called "natural-born subjects" (Francis Bacon, Case of the Post-Nati of Scotland (1608), p.649).
However, Judge Yelverton, one of the jurists who heard Calvin's Case in 1608, explained that Parliament does not have the power to transform anyone into an actual or real subject. Persons made subjects by acts of Parliament had the status or legal position of a "natural born subject", but they were not English subjects in the literal sense:
A parliament may make a man to be accompted as naturalised, and conclude every man to say but that he is so, but it can never make a man to be so indeede (Judge Yelverton (1608), as quoted by Bruce Galloway, The Union of England and Scotland 1603-1608, (2003), p.157).
As Cunningham explained in his Law Dictionary (1771), "naturalization" (an act of Parliament which transforms an alien into a natural-born subject) is merely a "fiction of law" which has no effect except in countries consenting to that fiction (Timothy Cunningham, A New and Complete Law-Dictionary (1771), p.95 (section titled "Aliens")).
Prior to 1604, persons born on English soil, to alien fathers, were not automatically "subjects" at birth. For example, Henry de Beaumont was regarded as an alien, even though he was born in England. His mother was English but his father was alien (Parry) 
In 1604, the English Parliament enacted a statute (a "public" act of Parliament) conferring automatic "denizen" status to English-born children of alien parents:
To place the Children, born within this Realm, of foreign Parents, in Degree for the first Birth or Descent only, as Aliens made Denizens, and not otherwise. (House of Commons Journal, Volume 1, 21 April 1604).
At the time, endenization by Parliament (as distinguished from endenization by the king) was synonymous with naturalization (Parry). Statutory denizens, like all other persons whom Parliament had naturalized either by statute or by petition, were deemed to be natural-born subjects in the eyes of the law.
According to William Blackstone:
The children of aliens, born here in England, are, generally speaking, natural-born subjects, and entitled to all the privileges of such. In which the constitution of France differs from ours; for there, by their jus albinatus, if a child be born of foreign parents, it is an alien. (William Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 1, Chapter 10 (1765)).
In 1777, Richard Wooddeson clarified Blackstone's comments. English-born children of alien parents were, at birth, naturalized by statute. Like all other persons naturalized by acts of Parliament, they were deemed to be natural-born subjects by law, but were not natural-born subjects in fact:
The issue [children] of an alien, born within the realm, are accounted [considered as, or deemed to be] natural subjects: in which respect, there is not, (tho sir William Blackstone supposes the contrary) any difference between our laws and those of France. In each country birth confers the rights of naturalization. (Richard Wooddeson, A Systematical View of the Laws of England - Volume 1 (1777), p.386).
The notion that the jus soli principle prevailed in France during the 18th century prior to the French Revolution "is an oversimplification" (Parry). In France, an individual was a Frenchman, with inheritance rights, if (a) he was born in France, (b) at least one of his parents was French at the time of his birth, and (c) he had established permanent legal residence in France:
Historians agree that for the purpose of inheritance a person was French if he or she resided in the territory and had been born there to at least one French parent. This definition required the combination of two conditions: descent and birth in the territory. (Tamar Herzog, Defining Nations (2003), p.192)
Persons who were naturalized in France, and persons who were born in France of non-French parents, were Frenchmen only in a legal sense. They were not true Frenchmen; they were required to pay alien taxes:
It was also the case in France that letters of naturalization and even birth in the territory could fail to transform foreigners into natives. On different occasions during the seventeenth century, for example, alien taxation was levied on "true" foreigners, "naturalized" foreigners, and native French who descended from foreign families. Stressing the foreignness of these individuals, many of whom were legally French, these decrees explained their taxation was justified because the presence of foreigners on French soil was profoundly illegal and because foreigners "usurped" the privileges of natives. Following this logic, in 1769, campaigns to distinguish true natives from actual (and legal) foreigners were launched (Tamar Herzog, Defining Nations (2003), pp.195-6)
The same was true in England. Persons born in England, of alien parents, were natural-born subjects but only in a legal sense. English-born children of English parents paid singe customs. The English-born children of alien parents were required to pay alien duties and were often treated as aliens in other ways as well:
There is a curious passage in Hale's Treatise Concerning the Customs concerning aliens' customs in the 17th century. He says "If an alien come into England and have issue [child] here, he [the child] is a natural-born subject. Yet ... such a natural-born subject hath been decreed heretofore to pay aliens' duties..." Hargrave, Tracts, vol. I (1787) 210. Cf. the similar tendency to treat the native members of the foreign Protestant congregations as aliens.... The statute 12 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11 furthered the policy by disabling infant children of aliens from trade. (Parry, footnote 327).
As Francis Bacon explained in 1608, the English-born children of alien parents, like the foreign-born children of English parents, are naturalized, at birth, by English law (i.e., by public acts of Parliament):
Furthermore as the law of England must favor naturalization as a branch of the law of nature, so it appears manifestly, that it doth favour it accordingly. For it is not much to make a subject naturalized by the law of England: it should suffice, either place or parents. If he be born in England it is no matter though his parents be Spaniards, or what you will: on the other side, if he be born of English parents it skilleth not though he be born in Spain, or in any other place of the world. In such sort doth the law of England open her lap to receive in people to be naturalized; which indeed sheweth the wisdom and excellent composition of our law ... (Francis Bacon, Case of the Post-Nati of Scotland (1608), pp.664-665, boldface emphasis added)
Cunningham's Law Dictionary was the only dictionary that James Madison ordered for the Continental Congress (Berry, pp.347-8). It defined natural-born subjects (in the actual or literal sense) as those born within the king's realm, of parents owing actual obedience (allegiance) to the king:
All those are natural born subjects, whose parents, at the time of their birth, were under the actual obedience of our king, and whose place of birth was within his dominions. (Timothy Cunningham, A New and Complete Law-Dictionary (1771), p.95 (section titled "Aliens"); also, Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgement of the Law -- Vol. 1 (1736), p.77).
All English subjects (except denizens by royal charter) were natural-born subjects in the eyes of the law. Even naturalized subjects were "natural born" in the legal sense. For example, during Queen Elizabeth's reign, German-born Garsome Wroth applied for and was granted English naturalization. His Bill of Naturalization, as approved by Parliament, stated that he shall be henceforth "taken and reputed the Queen's natural-born subject" (Parry).
Aliens who became English subjects by naturalization (private acts of Parliament), children born overseas to English fathers, and all children born on English soil (except the children of foreign diplomats and alien enemies) were natural-born subjects by law. But a person was an actual or literal natural-born subject only if he or she was born within the king's realm, of parents owing actual obedience (allegiance) to the king.
Since nearly all English subjects, including naturalized subjects, were "natural-born" in the legal sense, there is no difference between a "citizen" and a "natural born citizen" if "natural born" is understood according to its English legal meaning. The same is true in American law. Although there is a Constitutional difference between a "natural born citizen" and a "naturalized citizen," there is no statutory difference between the two:
In any case, the Supreme Court long has rejected the notion that naturalized citizens may or should possess rights different from those of other citizens under the law: ... "[The naturalized citizen] is distinguishable in nothing from a native citizen, except so far as the constitution makes the distinction. The law makes none." (Craig v. US, p.6, footnote 2)
There is a material difference between "citizen" and "natural born citizen" only if "natural-born" is confined to its literal meaning in 18th century English jurisprudence.
President Obama is not "natural born" in the strict literal sense because, when he was born, his father did not owe actual allegiance to the United States.
4.6: Natural Citizenship: Throughout Western European history, from the time of Ancient Greece through the 18th century, the most widely-read and widely-accepted literature regarding citizenship had consistently maintained that "natural citizenship" comes from one's parents, not the place of one's birth.
In Ancient Athens, one became a citizen either naturally or artificially. Natural citizenship (citizenship by birth) was acquired only by descent from one's legally-married parents:
The right of attending and voting was enjoyed by all citizens of full age (generally supposed to be twenty, certainly not less than eighteen) ... and not labouring under any atimia or loss of civil rights. They were either (1) natural-born (fysei kai genei) citizens, born in lawful wedlock of parents both Athenians ... or (2) dhmopoihtoi, presented with the freedom of the state, and enrolled in a deme, phratry, and tribe. The latter, however, were not qualified to hold the office of archon or any priesthood until the second generation. (William Smith, A concise dictionary of Greek and Roman antiquities: Ecclesia, 1890).
In Ancient Rome, citizens were either cives nati (citizens by birth) or cives facti (citizens by acquisition or grant). Cives nati were children of legally-married parents -- a father who was a Roman citizen, and a mother who was either a Roman citizen or a foreigner who, by applying for and accepting the legal right to marry (conubium) under Roman law, relinquished her right to confer her (foreign) nationality to her children (Hayes, Talmud Yerushalmi and Graeco-Roman Culture, Vol. 3 (2002), pp.84-85).
In Spelman's English translation (1758) of Roman Antiquities, the Latin term cives nati is translated as "natural born citizens" (Edward Spelman (translator), The Roman Antiquities, Volume 3 (1758), p.358).
In 1576, French political philosopher, Jean Bodin (1530-1596), published his most famous work, Les Six livres de la Republique ("The Six Books of the Republic"), which was immensely popular in 17th-century England:
Bodin's political works were well-known in early seventeenth-century England. One historian claimed that in 1600 no other political writer was cited in England "more often or more favorably" than Bodin. (Polly Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin's Case, (1997), p.131).
Bodin wrote that a "natural citizen" is one who acquires citizenship, at birth, from his parents, not from his place of birth:
Wherefore as of slaves some are born, some are made; so also of Citizens: some are made, some are born: the natural Citizen is he that is free of that wherein he is born; whether he be born but of one of his parents a Citizen, or of both of them Citizens. True it is that of ancient time (and yet at this present also in diverse Commonwealths) to be a Citizen it was needful to have both father and mother Citizens... For the place maketh not the child of a Stranger (man or woman) to be a citizen: and he that was born in Africk of two Roman citizens is no less a citizen, than if he had been born in Rome. (Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth (1576), translated by Knolles (1606), p.49).
Law of Nations, by Emerich de Vattel, was published in 1758. The first English translation appeared a year later. It was immensely popular and influential in America, especially after the American Revolution.
...it can be claimed, without exaggeration, that it is Vattel's interpretations and writings on the subject of the proper constitution of government that was most influential on the Founders of the American Republic. ... Vattel's interpretations of the law of nature were cited more frequently than any other writer's on international law in cases heard in the courts of the early United States, and The Law of Nations was the primary textbook on the subject in use in American universities. (Wolverton).
According to Vattel, a child naturally acquires, at birth, its father's citizenship, regardless of the child's birthplace :
... children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights. ... each citizen, on entering into society, reserves to his children the right of becoming members of it. The country of the fathers is therefore that of the children; and these become true citizens merely by their tacit consent. ... I say, that, in order to be of the country, it is necessary that a person be born of a father who is a citizen; for, if he is born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country. (Sect 212) ... Their children follow the condition of their fathers; (Sect 213) ... By the law of nature alone, children follow the condition of their fathers, and enter into all their rights; the place of birth produces no change in this particular (Sect 215) (Vattel).
The Supreme Court cited Vattel in its opinion regarding The Venus:
Society not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights. (Vattel, as quoted in The Venus)
In his concurring opinion in Scott v. Sandford (1856), Justice Daniel characterized Vattel's views on citizenship as unexceptionable (beyond criticism or objection).
In 18th century England and its American colonies prior to the American Revolution, there was a distinction between a "subject" of the king, and a "citizen" (freeman) of an English city or town. Birth on English soil was sufficient to confer "subject" status. But, in English cities and towns, the only way to acquire citizenship at birth was by inheritance from one's father. Municipal citizenship by birth was available "only to the legitimate and natural children of a male (or, since 1976, female) Freeman who were born after their parent's own Freedom admission" (City Freedom Archives).
Prior to the 14th Amendment, the Federal government was responsible for establishing the rules by which foreign-born immigrants became naturalized U.S. citizens; but each state was responsible for enacting its own laws governing the citizenship of children born within its borders. Anyone who acquired state citizenship at birth, according to state law, was automatically deemed a citizen of the United States. (Madison (2007)).
Some states, including Virginia, enacted laws conferring state citizenship upon all free white persons born within the state. If James McClure had been born in Virginia, he would have acquired state citizenship at birth, and would have thereby received Federal (United States) citizenship automatically. But, McClure was born in South Carolina, a state which had not enacted any state citizenship laws.
In the absence of an applicable state citizenship law, Federal (U.S.) citizenship at birth was determined by natural law, not English common law. In natural law, one acquires citizenship, at birth, by descent from one's parents, not the place of one's birth. Since his parents were not U.S. citizens when he was born, McClure did not acquire U.S. citizenship at birth. He became a U.S. citizen in later life, when his parents were naturalized:
Mr. Rodman hints, that it would have been sufficient for James McClure to have been born in the United States -- he is mistaken. The law of the United States recognizes no such claim. The law of Virginia, of 1792, does -- for, "all free persons born within the territory of this commonwealth," is deemed a citizen. The law of Virginia considers him as a son of the soil. An alien, as well as a citizen, may beget a citizen -- but the U. States' act does not go so far. A man must be naturalized to make his children such. ("Case of James McClure", The Alexandria Herald, Vol. I, No. 37, October 7, 1811, page 2, left-most column)
Based on the 18th century understanding of natural citizenship, Barack Obama, even if born on U.S. soil, did not acquire U.S. citizenship naturally at birth. When he was born, his father was not a U.S. citizen and his mother was too young to confer citizenship by descent.
If a pubic official is holding an office illegally, he is either a de facto officer or a usurper. A de facto officer is one who took office in good faith and is performing the duties and functions of that office, but his title to that office has a benign defect. A "benign" defect is one that (a) is a simple oversight or honest mistake, (b) had remained unnoticed for considerable time, or (c) is an inconsequential, easily-correctable technicality. In contrast, a usurper is one who took office in overt disregard for the law. (Columbia Law Review: De Facto Officer Doctrine).
The official acts of a usurper are null, void, and without legal effect. If the courts were to rule that President Obama is a usurper, all of his appointments, directives, executive orders, and all of the laws he had signed, could be declared invalid. However, if the courts rule that Barack Obama Jr. is a de facto officer, then, according to the de facto officer doctrine, President Obama's official actions are valid and legally binding, even though he is holding office illegally.
Not all federal courts recognize the de facto officer doctrine:
Several federal courts have abandoned the de facto officer doctrine entirely. In Silver v. United States Postal Service (9th Cir.1991) 951 F.2d 1033, the Ninth Circuit noted that only two federal circuits had adopted the doctrine, one circuit had limited the doctrine, and the United States Supreme Court in two cases had entertained challenges based on the Appointments Clause without considering the de facto officer doctrine. (Id. at p. 1036 fn. 2.) Similarly, in U.S. v. Gantt (9th Cir. 1999) 194 F.3d 987, the Ninth Circuit stated, "[f]ollowing the modern trend we choose not to ratify the actions of an improperly appointed officer of the United States under the ancient 'de facto officer' doctrine." (Id. at p. 998.) In both cases, the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the doctrine and reached the merits of whether the officer had been properly appointed. (Fair Political Practices v. Californians Against Corruption).
Other federal courts accept the de facto officer doctrine in general, but do not apply it in cases in which the actions of an ineligible officeholder contravene the purpose of the eligibility requirement:
Several federal cases have refused to apply the de facto officer doctrine where the purpose of the appointment requirement is to protect the person subject to the authority of the judicial officer. For example, in several [military] draft cases, federal courts have allowed a defendant to challenge an induction order on the ground that the draft board was not properly constituted. In U.S. v. Beltran (N.D.Cal.1969) 306 F.Supp. 385, the defendant successfully argued for an acquittal on the ground that the draft board members resided outside of their jurisdiction in violation of the federal appointment requirements. The district court noted that the purpose of this requirement was to promote impartiality, justice, and better decision-making in controversial cases. (Id. at p. 387-388.) Because these requirements were not just formalities, but were specifically designed to protect potential draftees from poor decisions, the District Court ruled that the de facto officer doctrine did not apply. (Id. at pp. 388-390.) Other courts have reached the same decision on the same grounds (see U.S. v. Cabbage (6th Cir. 1970) 430 F.2d 1037, 1041-1042; U.S. v. Williams (E.D. Penn. 1970) 317 F.Supp. 1363; U.S. v. Machado (N.D.Cal.1969) 306 F.Supp. 995, 999-1002), although some courts have disagreed and held that this defense would not be permitted (see, e.g., Czepil v. Hershey (7th Cir. 1970) 425 F.2d 251). (Fair Political Practices v. Californians Against Corruption).
The de facto officer doctrine does not protect -- hence you may challenge in court -- the action of an ineligible officeholder when such action violates a right or protection that the eligibility requirement confers to persons subject to the officeholder's authority:
Although the de facto officer doctrine generally denies individuals an interest in enforcing title requirements, the doctrine should not apply when a qualification for a specific office aims to protect the individuals subject to that official's authority. A breach of these statutes gives individuals a sufficiently personalized injury to challenge official action on the ground of defective title. (Kathryn A. Clokey, De Facto Officer Doctrine, (1985), p.1135.)
The de facto officer doctrine does not automatically apply in criminal cases and in cases in which a "non-frivolous constitutional" issue is raised.
Courts have developed certain exceptions to the de facto officer doctrine. Taken individually, the cases delineating these exceptions involve rather specific factual circumstances and can be narrowly confined. Collectively, however, they represent a gradual erosion of the doctrine. The Supreme Court itself has held that the doctrine does not apply where there is a "non-frivolous constitutional" challenge to an exercise of authority. In addition, one line of cases suggests that the doctrine cannot be reflexively invoked in criminal proceedings. One court has interpreted this series of cases as suggesting or requiring a balanced approach to the problem of the de facto authority. (Kathryn A. Clokey, De Facto Officer Doctrine (1985), p.1126.)
In Andrade v. Lauer (1984), the DC Court of Appeals held that, if there is a Constitutional defect in an officer's title to the office he is holding, you may collaterally challenge the action of that officer, but only if (a) you bring your challenge soon after the action is taken, and (b) the agency involved was given adequate prior notice of the defect.
The court viewed the primary interests served by the de facto officer doctrine as protection of the public's reliance on past governmental actions and protection of the government's ability to take final and effective action. The court argued that these "core purposes" are served when a contestant brings the challenge soon after the adverse governmental action is taken and he demonstrates that the agency or department involved had reasonable notice of the title defect. Accordingly, the court would allow a collateral title challenge to proceed only where these two requirements have been met. (Kathryn A. Clokey, De Facto Officer Doctrine (1985), pp.1127-1128).
Assuming that both requirements (adequate prior notice and timeliness of challenge) are met, the Andrade ruling opens the door to collateral attacks against Obama's official actions:
Under the holding in Andrade v. Lauer, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that the de facto officer's doctrine does not prohibit "collateral attacks" of official actions based upon a public officer's lack of eligibility. These are not quo warranto suits to remove the official; they are civil suits to challenge a specific action of that official.
In the Andrade case, the plaintiffs were Government employees who lost their jobs to "reduction in force" ordinances which cut whole departments from the Government budget. The plaintiffs sued alleging those who did the cutting were not Constitutionally qualified to make such decisions in that their appointments violated the appointments clause of the US Constitution.
The DC District Court held that the plaintiffs had no standing other than to bring a "direct attack" in quo warranto to remove the alleged usurper. But the DC Court of Appeals reversed and said the plaintiffs, who had suffered real injuries, could bring such an action on a case by case basis if they could prove their injury in fact (being fired) was caused by a Government official who was not eligible to serve.
They opened the door to a floodgate of litigation by an incredibly large field of possible plaintiffs who might challenge every single official action of the Obama administration on the basis that he isn't eligible. (Donofrio: Quo Warranto Legal Brief, pp.19-20)
In Ryder v. United States (1995), the petitioner, James Ryder, challenged the decision of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review, on grounds that two of the three judges comprising the court had not been appointed legally. The two judges at issue were appointed by the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation, in violation of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Ryder's favor. Three factors appear to have influenced to the Court's decision:
Some courts may allow eligibility challenges made by a "reluctant defendants" in lawsuits initiated by purportedly ineligible officeholders:
The [de facto officer] doctrine is typically used against a plaintiff who is suing an administrative agency. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that courts have the limited discretion not to apply the [de facto officer] doctrine when an agency sues a "reluctant defendant." In Trager, supra, 118 Wis.2d 204 [346 N.W.2d 756], a zoning board found that defendant Trager's garage violated a recently enacted zoning ordinance ... The county then sued Trager seeking a mandatory injunction that he remove his garage. ... The court noted that in many cases the party challenging the order is suing, but in some cases "the administrative agency initiates a civil proceeding to enforce the agency's decision and the party aggrieved by the decision ... seeks to defend against the enforcement action by challenging the validity of the agency decision". (County of Sauk, supra, 118 Wis.2d at pp.212 [346 N.W.2d at pp.760].) "Trager is the reluctant defendant in a court action initiated by the administrative agency." (Id. at 212 [346 N.W.2d at p.760].) (Fair Political Practices v. Californians Against Corruption).
At this time, we are not aware of any case in which a litigant with court-recognized standing has pursued a collateral attack against any of Obama's presidential actions. In Purpura v. Sebelius, the plaintiffs argued that the ObamaCare law (HR3590: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) is unconstitutional because it was signed by a Constitutionally-ineligible President. Since ObamaCare affects the public in general and does not harm the plaintiffs a unique or particularized manner, the court ruled that the plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the ObamaCare law.
Nevertheless, as increasingly large numbers of persons and businesses are being uniquely harmed or injured by Obama's official acts, it is only a matter of time before an injured party with proper standing files a collateral attack against a law or executive order that Obama has signed.
The following factors may affect the strength, therefore the outcome, of a collateral attack:
According to the U.S. State Department's Security Clearance Guidelines, the circumstances of one's birth -- for example, birth in a foreign country, birth to a foreign-citizen parent, and/or the acquisition of foreign nationality at birth -- are not, by themselves, sufficient reasons to impugn anyone's judgment or loyalty:
Merely having dual citizenship will not automatically result in a security clearance denial ... Generally people who acquired dual citizenship at birth and have done nothing to obtain recognition of the foreign citizenship will encounter little or no problem in obtaining a clearance unless there are other security issues in their case. (Dual Citizenship And Security Clearances).
One's values, attitudes, perspectives, beliefs and prejudices arise, in large part, from one's upbringing and education, not so much from the circumstances of one's birth. Nevertheless, birth circumstances sometimes play a stage-setting role. Children born in a foreign country are often raised in a foreign country. Children begotten by foreigners often end up being reared and educated by foreigners. Even though birth circumstances, by themselves, exert little, if any, direct influence on an adult's judgment, they are often preludes to one's upbringing and education which can and do affect one's choices in later life.
Obama's foreign citizenship at birth and his subsequent foreign upbringing are distinct issues. Nevertheless, the two are interconnected. Both are the direct result of the same underlying factor: his mother's choice of husbands who are foreign citizens, not U.S. citizens.
NOTE: The mere acquisition of foreign citizenship at birth, in and of itself, does not indicate foreign influence. However, foreign citizenship at birth is often a precursor to foreign parenting, upbringing and education, which may instill foreign values, ideologies and perspectives which may influence one's judgment and decision-making in later life.
The courts have allowed collateral attacks against the official actions of an ineligible officeholder when those actions violate the purpose of the eligibility requirement. The purpose of the "natural born citizen" provision is to exclude "foreigners" (specifically, persons born with foreign nationality) from the presidency, and thereby reduce the risk of foreign influence.
NOTE: By excluding (from the presidency) persons who were born with foreign nationality, the "natural born citizen" provision does not absolutely prevent, but at least reduces the risk of, electing and inaugurating a President whose judgment appears influenced by foreign parenting, upbringing and education.
The purpose of the "natural born citizen" provision is contravened when a President takes actions and issues directives which appear to be influenced by values, attitudes, ideologies, perspectives and prejudices associated with the foreign country of his citizenship and education. If you are suffering an injury in fact as a direct result of a presidential action or directive in which there is an appearance of foreign influence, you might wish to consider a collateral attack against that action or directive.
According to multiple historical sources, the purpose of the "natural born citizen" provision in the Constitution is to protect the American people and their government from "foreign influence" exerting itself through the presidency. "Foreign influence" is not limited to the political and economic interests of a foreign government. The cultural, ideological and religious climate of one's upbringing and education can also influence one's judgment and decision-making in later life.
President Obama was born on August 4, 1961. At the time, he acquired British nationality by descent from his father, Barack Obama Sr., who was a native of an East African British colony -- Kenya. On December 12, 1963, Kenya gained its independence from Great Britain, at which time Barack Obama Jr.'s British nationality automatically converted into Kenyan citizenship. President Obama's Kenyan citizenship expired on August 4, 1984, but was reinstated in 2010 when Kenya adopted its new Constitution (Obama's eligible for president, in Kenya).
President Obama has maintained close ties to Kenya, which he regards as his "home" (Video: Obama called Kenya his 'home'). In 2006, Obama traveled to Kenya and campaigned for Luo Raila Odinga, who was running for the Kenyan presidency. It appears that Obama, while President of the United States, significantly increased aid to Kenya (Kenya Sees Spike in Obama Administration-Funded Projects).
President Obama is technically a Kenyan citizen today. Under Kenya's new Constitution (adopted in 2010), Obama is a Kenyan "citizen by birth" and is eligible to run for the Kenyan presidency (Obama's eligible for president, in Kenya).
On January 27, 1964, Stanley Ann Dunham filed for divorce from Obama Senior. In March 1965, she married Indonesian citizen, Lolo Soetoro, and thereby became an Indonesian citizen by marriage. In 1966, Lolo, Stanley Ann and Obama Jr. relocated to Indonesia. According to the Roman Catholic Franciscus Assisi Primary School in Jakarta, Barack Obama Jr. was registered there as a "citizen" of Indonesia, under the name Barry Soetoro (Soetoro Dunham Marriage: Indonesia).
From 1966 through 1971, he was raised in Indonesia, as an Indonesian citizen, by parents both of whom were Indonesian citizens . During this time period, Indonesian President Suharto maintained political power by (a) monitoring and controlling the news media (Media in Indonesia), and (b) "selective but effective" targeting of political opponents (New Order (Indonesia)). Obama's step-father, Lolo Soetoro, was an Indonesian citizen who held a job requiring him to be friendly with and supportive of the Indonesian government:
Lolo Soetoro had been an official of the Director General's office in the TNI Topography division of the Indonesian Army. He later becomes an executive with American Mobil Corporation, where he is a key liaison between the oil company and the Suharto regime. Suharto had been installed as the American friendly Indonesian President in 1967. (The Obama File: Indonesia).
Barack Obama's legal birth father (Obama Senior) and step-father (Lolo Soetoro) were Muslims. The two countries in which Barack Obama and his fathers have held citizenship -- Kenya and Indonesian -- are countries with histories of Islamic-Christian conflict. Today, Kenya and Indonesia rank 40th and 45th, respectively, among the word's most difficult nations in which to be a Christian (Where Christian Persecution is the Worst). Although homeschooling is currently legal in both countries, the right of Christian parents to homeschool their children is under threat in Kenya (Kenya Homeschool Movement).
President Obama, and his appointees operating under his direction and control, have recently taken official actions adversely affecting Conservative Christians in the United States. These actions include:
The fact that Conservative Christians oppose an official action does not, in and of itself, indicate that the action was foreign-influenced. A natural-born-citizen President may have taken the same action under the same circumstances. However, for five years, Obama was educated in, and was a citizen of, a nation harboring anti-Christian sentiments, and was raised by a father whose religion is often associated with such sentiments. Although the "natural born citizen" provision does not protect Christians from non-Christian-friendly policies, it nevertheless protect Christians from such policies when they appear to arise from the President's upbringing and citizenship in a non-Christian-friendly foreign nation.
When President Obama and his appointees take official actions which infringe on your religious liberties, you might have the option of pursuing a collateral attack against those official actions, on grounds that (a) Barack Obama does not meet the Constitutional "natural born citizen" eligibility requirement of the presidency, hence both he and his appointees are de facto officers, and (b) his official actions and directives violate the purpose of the natural born citizen eligibility requirement, which is to protect the public from presidential actions exhibiting the appearance of foreign influence.
If you are facing unique harm or injury as a result of a law that President Obama has signed or a directive or executive order that he has issued, do not assume a priori that the law, directive or executive order was issued by a de jure officer. There are fact-based reasons to doubt President Obama's "natural born citizen" status. In at least some cases, the official acts of President Obama and/or his appointees may be vulnerable to collateral attack.
If you have decided to incur the time, cost and risk of litigation, you owe it to yourself to include, in your lawsuit or legal defense, all facts supportive of your case, including facts which impugn the constitutionality of Obama's presidency.
This article is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice. You should seek professional legal assistance when considering whether a collateral attack is appropriate for your own unique and specific circumstances.
 There is a distinction between what a natural born citizen is, and how someone becomes a natural born citizen. In the 1797 English translation of Vattel's Law of Nations, a person acquires natural born citizenship by being born in a country, of parents who are citizens of that country:
The natives, or natural born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. (Law of Nations, Book 1, § 212).
According to U.S. Representative John Bingham (1815-1900), father of the 14th Amendment, you are a natural born citizen if, first, you were born in the United States, and, second, at the time of your birth, your parents owed "allegiance to no other sovereignty":
Who are natural-born citizens but those born within the Republic? Those born within the Republic, whether black or white, are citizens by birth -- natural-born citizens. ... All from other lands, who, by the terms of your laws and in compliance with their provisions become naturalized, are adopted citizens of the United States; all other persons born within the Republic, of parents owing allegiance to no other sovereignty, are natural-born citizens. Gentlemen can find no exception to this statement except what is said in the Constitution in relation to Indians. The reason why that exception was made in the Constitution is apparent to everybody. The several Indian tribes were recognized at the organization of this Government as independent sovereignties. They were treated as such; and they have been dealt with by the Government ever since as separate sovereignties. Therefore they were excluded from the general rule. (Congressional Globe, 37th, 2nd Sess.(1862), p.1639, boldface emphasis added)
Under Bingham's definition, natural born citizenship does not require parental citizenship; it only requires that the parents not owe allegiance to any foreign power. Emancipated slaves, even if not U.S. citizens, are not foreign nationals; consequently, their U.S.-born children are natural born citizens. On the other hand, Native-American Indians owe allegiance to their respective tribes. The U.S. government considers Indian tribes as foreign nations. Consequently, Indian children, even if born on U.S. soil, are not natural born citizens.
The above "definitions" of natural born citizen -- the one associated with Vattel and the other associated with Bingham -- are not true definitions: they merely describe the circumstances under which natural born citizenship is acquired. Neither definition specifies what a natural born citizen is. In contrast, Jeremiah Black (1810-1883), the 24th Attorney General of the United States, defines "native" (natural born citizen) as one who, from birth, owes allegiance to the U.S. exclusively and "never did owe fealty elsewhere" (Jeremiah Black, Opinion upon Expatriation and Naturalization, 1859). Under this defintion, John McCain, though born in a foreign country, was a natural born citizen at the time of his birth, because he was born with exclusive U.S. citizenship; when he was born, he was not a citizen or subject of any foreign country.
Today Panama is a country that confers citizenship via jus soli, which if he was born there today would mean that John McCain would not born with only American claims to his allegiance. BUT, in 1936 Panama's sole principle of birthright citizenship was jus sanguinis. Yes, Panama did include in their Constitution an avenue of Panamanian citizenship John McCain could have used, but it was not an automatic birthright. ... The point is that Panama made no claim to John's allegiance at his birth, John was born with only the United States of America having a claim to his allegiance. (The Devil makes some Damned Deals)
 The word "native", when used as an adjective (as in native-born), implies birth in a particular place. But when used as a noun, the "native" of a place is someone who, by birth, belongs to that place exclusively.
 In U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), the Supreme Court ignored the transcripts of the 1866 congressional debates, in which the Framers of the 14th Amendment repeatedly explained the meaning of "jurisdiction" as used in the 14th Amendment. By declaring those transcripts to be "not admissible," the Court freed itself to develop its own more-liberal definition of "jurisdiction" and to retroactively apply this definition to the 14th Amendment. The Court's "refusal to consider reliable evidence of original intent" has been characterized as inexcusable (Madison (2006)).
 Prior to the Protestant Reformation (1517), the only "aliens" in England were those from France, a country to which England claimed legal ownership. Thus the word "alien" referred to persons originating from territories belonging to England by law, even though England did not possess those territories in fact (see Tutorial, Question 15: Calvin's Case).
According to Thomas de Littleton (1407-1481), birthplace alone determined whether someone was, at birth, a subject or an alien. But Littleton's understanding appears to have been an oversimplification:
If any warning against the drawing of hasty deductions from the scanty precedents down to the seventeenth century is required, it is provided by the entirely misleading picture of the law of alienage given by Littleton. The mediaeval lawyers followed up the implications of the alien's inability to hold land by denying him a real action. This led Littleton, following the natural instinct of the property lawyer to regard his department as the whole law, to deny him both real and personal actions. But it is doubtful if this ever was the law. And, even if it were the common law, it was not the whole law. To maintain otherwise would be to ignore the long history of the foreign merchants in England. (Parry)
During the Protestant Reformation (which began in 1517), England was flooded with Protestant refugees from countries to which England made no legal claim. In 1604, the English Parliament passed legislation granting "statutory denizen" status to English-born children of non-English parents. Such children were natural-born subjects in the eyes of the law, even though they were not natural-born subjects in fact.
 Vattel's "Law of Nations" (published in 1758) made a distinction between a "citizen" and a "native". A child, at birth, naturally acquires the citizenship of its father, regardless of its place of birth. But, in the special case in which a child happens to be born in the country of its parents' citizenship, the child is more than just a "citizen" by birth: it is also a "native" of its parents' country. In 1797, the term "natural born citizen" was added to the English translation of Vattel's Law of Nations and was used in a manner implying synonymity with the Vattelian word "native". This does not change the fact that, prior to 1797, Vattel and various earlier writers have consistently maintained that, although there were various ways of acquiring citizenship artificially, the only way to acquire citizenship naturally at birth was by descent (inheritance) from one's parents, regardless of birthplace.
 Barack Obama Jr.'s residence in Indonesia was not continuous. During at least a portion of his third grade year, he attended the Noelani Primary School in Hawaii (Obama File: Third Grade).
The Federal judges, listed below, are de facto judges. They were appointed by Barack Obama who, being Constitutionally ineligible to serve as President, does not have Constitutional authority to appoint anyone. As a general rule, decisions and rulings by a de facto judge are valid and legally binding; but there are exceptions to this rule. When a de facto judge is notified of the defect in his appointment before he takes any action on a particular case, he should recuse himself from that case, especially if the case includes a challenge to Obama's presidential eligibility.
Source: List of federal judges appointed by Barack Obama (as of May 23, 2013)
Copyrignt (c) 2013, Stephen Tonchen. All rights reserved.